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COMMENT 
THE DISPARITY ISSUE: A CONTEXT FOR THE 
GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL DECISION 
John]. Costonis* 
Transferable development rights programs, while they represent 
an important new means of land use regulation, are of unsettled 
constitutional validity. The recent decision of the New York Court 
of Appeals in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 
upheld such a program restricting the development of the Grand 
Central Terminal property and granting its private owner 11011-
dollar compensation in the form of transferable development rights. 
In this Comment, Professor Costonis focuses on the doctrinal sig­
nificance of this decision in forging a "middle way" of land use reg­
ulation between the paths of police power and eminent domain. 
'' T HE concept of property," Professor Philbrick advised some years ago, "has never been, is not, and never can 
be of definite content." 1 Unnerving and intriguing, his admoni­
tion explains why property jurisprudence stubbornly resists the 
best efforts of courts, legislators, and scholars to etch the con­
cept's dimensions in stone. Each age must reformulate the prem­
ises of those preceding it to bring the entitlements of private 
ownership into conformity with dominant contemporary values. 
No controversy better illustrates the changing conceptions of 
property than the recent decision of the New York Court of 
Appeals, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 
(Grand Central Terminal) .2 That decision upheld the city's 
power to prevent, without providing dollar compensation, con­
struction by the Penn Central Company and its lessee of a 59-
story, $100 million office building atop the Grand Central Ter­
minal. The decision is important for its immediate result- the 
preservation of New York City's best-known landmark building. 
But it has larger significance, I believe, in its teachings concern­
ing the root entitlements of land ownership today. Chief Judge 
Charles Breitel's opinion, written fo.r a unanimous court, both 
completes a cycle dating back to the United States Supreme 
Court's 1926 decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B., Harvard, 
1959; LL.B., Columbia, 1965. 
1 Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 
696 ( 1938). 
2 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), cert. granted, 46 
U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1977) (77-444). 
402 
THE DISPARITY ISSUE 
Co.,3 sustaining zoning as an exercise of the police power, and 
shapes new law for the future, redefining the manner in which 
public and private interests in land should be accommodated. 
This Comment examines both facets of the Janus-like opinion 
within the context of what is here termed the "disparity issue" -
the discrepancy in protection afforded property values depending 
upon whether government reduces them under its police power 
or its eminent domain power. My thesis is that Grand Central 
Terminal discards the dichotomy of current law and accepts the 
view that for certain types of land use controversies - here la­
beled the "disparity genre" - the financial burden of public inter­
vention should fall neither solely upon the landowner, as orthodox 
police power doctrine would have it, nor upon government, as 
established eminent domain principles would dictate. Chief Judge 
Brei tel achieves this turnabout in two ways: first, by recognizing 
that in appropriate instances police power regulation should be 
accompanied by a compensatory off set that affords the landowner 
an equitable return on his property; 4 and second, by excluding 
from the base upon which that return is calculated what he calls 
the "social increment" of value, i .e.,  that accruing to the regu­
lated property by virtue of government's activities.5 
I. THE DISPARITY ISSUE 
The Supreme Court's decision in Euclid sustained govern­
ment's power to restrict private land's profitability by zoning in 
order to achieve community planning goals. It held that zoning 
measures nerther spring the fifth amendment's "taking" trap nor 
offend the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantees merely 
because a higher rate of return on zoned property would be pos­
sible absent the regulation. Landowners must simply accept the 
loss in value of their property - in Euclid a reduction from a 
market value of $870,000 to a zoned value of $540,000 - as one 
of organized society's less happy facts of life. 
While Euclid laid the foundation for modern community plan­
ning, it also exacerbated the problem of the disparity in the treat­
ment accorded landowners depending upon whether their property 
value is diminished by the police or the eminent domain power. 
Euclid taught that an owner forfeits profit e xpectancies in his 
land to the extent that its value is reduced under the police power. 
But for measures implemented ·through eminent domain, he re­
ceives prompt payment of the complete loss in dollars under the 
3 272 U.S. 365 (r926). 
4 See pp. 4u-r2 infra. 
5 See pp. 415-18 infra. 
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"highest and best use" standard. N �ar the s�ifting
. 
bor?er �­
tween "takings" of property and vahd regulation, this disparity 
of treatment has been a source o f  confusion and controversy ever 
since the Euclid decision. 
Jn fairness to the Court, the disparity issue was hardly as 
visible in 192 6 as it is today. For one thing, the nature of the 
landowner's objection is more compelling at the present time. The 
Ambler Realty Company had demanded protection for no less 
than the full prezoning value of its property - which the Court 
without unfairness could declare a mere expectancy unprotected 
by the Constitution. But landowners today have long since aban­
doned that outpost. Conceding government's power to bite deeply 
into land's expectancy values, they ask only for some bare mini­
mum of postzoning return in their parcels. Whether they are 
entitled to such a minimum and, i f  so, how much, are questions 
unresolved by Euclid. 
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located 
the police and eminent domain powers on different planets.6 Gen­
erally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing 
public acquisition of private property for improvements that 
would be available for "public use," literally construed. To the 
· police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive 
task of preventing harmful externalities, a point reflected in the 
Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster 
its support of zoning.7 So long a s  suppression of a privaitely 
authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public 
purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensa­
tion whatever. With the p rogressive growth of government's in­
volvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has 
contracted considerably. Today government often employs em­
inent domain interchangeably with o r  as a useful complement to 
the police power - a trend expressly approved in the Supreme 
Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,8 which broadened the 
reach of eminent domain's "public u se" test to match that of the 
police power's standard of  "public purpose." 
Finally, the disparity issue was easily overlooked in Euclid 
bec
.
a�se th: city's zoning scheme squared neatly with the exter­
nalities
. 
rationale. The plan merely divided the city into various 
use, height, and bulk districts in order to minimize potential con-
� For a more c�mple�e exposition of the views developed in this and the fol­
lowmg paragraph, mcludmg extensive citation to the pertinent literature and cases, 
see Costonis, "Fai r" Compensation and the Accommodation Power· Antidotes for 
th T k' I · 
. 
e a zng '!1'passe in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1033-46 (19z5) [hereinafter cited as Fair Compensation]. 
272 U.S. at 387-88. 
8 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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fticts (externalities) between neighboring land uses. In  the Su­
preme Court's apt calculus, Ambler's desire to profit at the ex­
pense of other Euclid property owners counted for very little 
against the city's  need to prevent harmful externalities through 
comprehensive zoning controls. Because the plan was applicable 
citywide and property owners in the same zones as Ambler in­
curred identical burdens and benefits, Ambler could hardly object 
that it was being singled out to underwrite a community benefit 
or otherwise to bear costs that, in fairness, should have fallen on 
Euclid's citizenry as a whole. 
But let us update the scenario to portray the disparity genre 
of land use dispute, a genre that promises to become a staple in 
our environmentally conscious age. Suppose that Ambler's pro­
posed land use would not perceptibly harm its neighbors, that 
Ambler alone or a small group including Ambler were precluded 
from construction because the community wished the property to 
remain in the status quo, and, finally, that the return possible on 
the existing use were marginal or perhaps even negative. In short, 
let us substitute the Penn Central Company for Ambler. As owner 
of Grand Central Terminal, a landmark located in an area gen­
erally zoned for sixty-story-plus megastructures, Penn Central 
seeks the same entitlement as its neighbors to build to these levels 
but is denied permission to do so because the good people of New 
York City so enjoy its diminutive landmark. With these refine­
ments in plot, the disparity issue, which seemed a bit player in 
Euclid, strides conspicuously to center stage demanding the atten­
tion of legislatures and judges alike. 
II .  THE NEED FOR A "MIDDLE WAY" 
Recounting the principal questions that must be addressed to 
resolve the disparity issue both strengthens the case for seeking a 
"middle way" and exposes the risks that attend the quest. These 
questions, as I see it, are five. First, is it the case, as the loose 
language of innumerable zoning opinions implies, that overregula­
tion is a "taking," hence remediable exclusively through emin�nt 
domain proceedings ? 9 Aren't enactments that exceed the pohce 
power's ambit, conventionally defined as permissible noncompe�­
satory regulation, simply invalid police power measur�s! save m 
the rare case when government acts in bad faith or m1ures the 
landowner in ways that cannot be rectified through noncompensa-
9 The source of this non sequitur is Justice Holmes' famous aphorism in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), tha� "while �roperty 
may be regulated to a certain extent [under the police power], if regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking." 
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tory relief? Second, why must compensation be pegged to the 
prohibitively expensive "highest and best use" level i!1 cases �f 
overregulation? Is that standard really necessary to msure fair 
treatment for the landowner? Isn't it absurd a half century after 
Euclid to allow government to reduce land values far below this 
level in the run-of-the-mine zoning case but to insist that, should 
government seek to deal equitably with the landowner, nothing 
less than restoration of the land's value to its highest and best use 
will do? Third, why must compensation be paid in dollars when 
government, though often strapped for funds, is in a position to 
offer various nondollar trade-offs of palpable economic value? 
Fourth, why must government be constrained by eminent do­
main's burdensome procedural requirements when the effects of 
overregulation can be overcome in many cases by providing an 
appropriate compensatory offset in the regulatory program itself? 
Finally, should land's value in disparity disputes be fixed inde­
pendently of the landowner's identity or of government's con­
tribution to the land's profitability? Should it make a difference, 
for example, if the landowner has been the beneficiary of various 
public subsidies or if the land has experienced a sharp increase in 
value as a result of publicly financed improvements on or near 
that land? 
III. THE SEARCH FOR A "MIDDLE WAY" 
However desirable a middle way between the paths of the police 
power and eminent domain may be, determining its precise form 
is beset with perils. The primary conceptual issue is whether 
sufficient flexibility can be found in the police or eminent domain 
powers to locate the alternative within the compass of one or the 
other, or, if not, whether recourse must be had to a third power, 
intermediate between :the two. But questions must be asked about 
the disparity genre as well. Are instances of the genre likely to 
recur often enough to warrant the laborious efforts that doctrinal 
reform will undoubtedly require? Or are we dealing wi1th a prob­
lem peculiar to a limited category of properties such as land­
marks? Again, is the nature of the public intervention defining 
the genre sufficiently discrete to set it apart from the "true" police 
power �nd the "
.
true" :minent domain case? If not, grave equal pro.tection quest1o�s a�1se. If the genre is merely a variant of the police po�er, how Justify awarding compensation at all? If a vari­
ant of 
.
eminent domain, how rationalize a lesser amount of com­
pensat10n for the genre landowner than for one whose property has been condemned outright? 
. 
T
��n there are the practical issues of the alternative's admin­istrabihty. The most stubborn of these is fixing the amount of 
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compensation or, as I have labeled it in another essay, the "fair 
compensation" 10 due the overregulated landowner. Cases follow­
ing Euclid teach that fourteenth amendment objections are stilled 
when zoning leaves the landowner with a "reasonable beneficial 
use" - that hypothetical residuum of private utility which is a 
prerequisite for valid regulation. Presently employed as a thresh­
old test to determine whether the police power has been abused, 
this standard is also useful in measuring the "fair compensation" 
due the overregulated landowner which, by hypothesis, equals the 
difference between the land's reasonable beneficial use and the 
lower return accruing to it by virtue of the overregulatory meas­
ure.11 Applying this standard to individual properties, however, 
raises complex ethical and accounting issues 12 - both for legis­
latures, upon whom the burden falls in the first instance, and for 
judges, who must review legislative or administrative determina­
tions, or, as a last resort, articulate and apply the standard them­
selves. The burden becomes even more trying if Chief Judge 
Breitel's concern for the "social increment" of value is factored 
into the equation because it becomes necessary to separate out 
the public and private increments of value in the pertinent prop­
erty. 
Finally, implementation of an alternative requires legislative 
and administrative bodies to identify appropriate nondollar trade­
offs and to incorporate them into the fair compensation package. 
Illustrative is the transferrable development rights (TDR) de­
vice litigated in Grand Central Terminal.13 In return for retaining 
the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central 
was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the author­
ized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's 
designation as a landmark- the rights which would have been 
exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to coun­
tenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neigh­
boring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling 
Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by con­
structing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence 
more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 
10 See generally Fair Compensation, supra note 6. 
11 For a more detailed explanation of the content and relationship of the con­
cepts of fair compensation and reasonable beneficial use, as well as a schematization 
of other indices of land's economic value (including the highest and best use 
standard), see id. at 104g--55. 
12 See pp. 422-25 infra. 
13 The relevant ordinances are set forth in NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESO­
LUTION art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79 (1971). For a more extensive account of the 
program, see Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE 
L.J. 338, 349-59 ( 1972). An excellent general bibliography on TDR is DEVELOP­
MENT RIGHTS BIBLIOGRAPHY (Rutgers Univ. Leaflet No. 533, 1976). 
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Municipal officials and courts reviewing their efforts must con­
front an amalgam of economic, planning, and legal questions when 
dealing with TDR programs or rela�ed trade-off� that allocate 
bonus building rights as nondollar fair compensation. Are these 
rights in fact sufficiently profitable at the user site �r sites to cure 
the overregulation? Do such schemes undercut rational planning 
by introducing "artificial" bulk restrictions and waivers into the 
municipal zoning code? Are the benefits that these schemes puta­
tively accord the overregulated landowner improperly purchased 
at the expense of other landowners in the transfer district who 
may be disfavored by the deliberate lowering of de nsity levels to 
enhance the transfer rights' marketability or who must contend 
with the congestion and other burdens caused by larger-than-nor­
mal structures within the transfer district? 
A measure of the complexity of the foregoing issues appears 
in Chief Judge Breitel's lament in Grand Central Terminal that 
judges who attempt to address them 
[do ] not pursue a path guided by ample precedent or wholly de­
veloped principles. The area is not merely difficult; it has at 
present viewing impenetrable densities. The last word has not 
only not been spoken ; it has hardly been envisaged.14 
The judiciary's reluctance to face the issues squarely is largely 
due to a breakdown in the national consensus concerning what the 
entitlements of private land ownership should be. From the found­
ing of the Republic to at least the first third of this century, most 
Americans would have agreed that property's functions include 
buffering the individual from state intrusion rn and encouraging 
efficient, and, for the landowner, profitable exploitation of the na­
tion's land resources.16 But neither of these functions commands 
universal assent today. Landed property's preeminence in Amer­
ican folklore has withered in the face of the nation's urbanization, 
the shift in the preponderance of its privately held wealth from 
land to personalty, and the emergence of other safeguards against 
official caprice. Similarly, ·the imperative that land be exploited 
for profit has fared poorly against the telling assault of environ-
14 42 N.Y.2d at 337, 336 N.E.2d at 1279, 397 N.Y.S.2 d at 922. 
15 See, e.g., 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 426 (J. Boyd ed. r953) (celebration of the yeoman farmer); Griswold, Jefferson's Agrarian Democracy, in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 39 (H. Dethloff ed. r97r). See generally J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ch. 7 (J. Gough ed. 
1956) (private property as a check on monarchical caprice). 
D 
1� The Euclid decision itself evidences the depth of support for this function. espite the extravagance - to contemporary eyes - of the Ambler Realty Com· pa�y's claim, Euclid was resolved 6-3, and then only upon rehearing and the switch of votes by Justice Sutherland and one other Justice see McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 710, 712 (1946) . 
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mentalists, proponents of growth control, and others who ques­
tion centuries-long traditions favoring land's free alienability and 
unhindered development. 
With the ancien regime fast fading, legislators and judges 
have been as befuddled as the rest of us. The former have essen­
tially ignored the problem even though they are better equipped 
than the courts to take a leadership role in forging a new con­
sensus. Without legislative aid, and reluctant to strike out on 
their own, the courts have temporized with incanta:tion that de­
cides individual cases but leaves untouched the underlying con­
flicts that make these cases so troublesome. Faithful to Hamlet's 
perception that we would "rather bear those ills we h ave,/Than 
fly to others that we know not of," 17 both institutions have been 
content along with many commentators to acquiesce in the present 
system's inadequacies or even to deny their very existence. All the 
more extraordinary then is Chief Judge Breitel's resolution of the 
Grand Central Terminal controversy. 
IV. Grand Central Terminal: THE CONTROVERSY 
AND THE DECISION 
At stake in the Grand Central Terminal litigation was the 
aesthetic integrity of a world-renowned architectural gem. An 
imposing Beaux Arts building whose south facade has been termed 
"one of the most stunning achievements in the history of urban 
design," 18 the Terminal has landmark qualities beyond dispute. 
Setting it apart from other landm arks, however, is the integration 
of its base with a comprehensive transit interchange which has 
substantially increased its value and that of surrounding sites.19 
Penn Central attempted to capitalize on the site's prime location 
by leasing the air rights above the landmark for construction of 
a 59-story office building. A steep annual rental was stipulated 
in the lease: one million dollars during the construction period and 
a minimum of three million dollars thereafter.20 But the ven:ture 
17 W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act Ill, SC. i, ll. 81--82. 
18 Crock, Depot Loses a Battle But Preservationists Could Win the War, Wall 
St. J., Sept. 13, 1977, at l, col. 4 (quoting Ada Louise Huxtable, New York Times 
architecture critic). 
19 The intermediate court characterized this feature of the Terminal as follows: 
The complete submergence of all the tracks and a double level track system 
not only resulted in the accommodation of more trains without the acqui­
sition of more land but permitted construction of revenue producing build­
ings on air rights owned over the railroad tracks and the development of 
Park Avenue as one of the Nation's most prestigious residential communities. 
Penn Central Trar.sp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 269, 377 N.Y.S.2d 
20, 25 (1975). 
20 Id. at 270, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 26. 
410 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 :402 
was stymied in 1969 when the New York City Landmarks Com­
mission, appalled that Penn Central contemplated obliterating 
the Terminal's south facade, scorned the proposal as an "esthetic 
joke" 21 and refused to grant the requisite approvals. Earlier. 
anticipating charges of overregulation in its landmarks program: 
the city had implemented the TDR scheme described above. Th� 
city also hoped that the residual income accruing to Penn Central 
from the continued use of the landmark as a transportation ter­
minal, from the rentals of its many concessionaires, and from tax 
exemptions allowed it over many years, would enable the land­
mark program to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Despite the 
TDR option and the Terminal's residual income, however, Penn 
Central sued for a declaration of the program's invalidity, an in­
junction against its enforcement, and compensation for a tempo­
rary "taking" during the period from denial of approval to judicial 
resolution of the dispute. 
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the program and 
denied compensation.22 In doing so, the court relied in part on 
the social increment theory of valuation, finding that public aid 
in making the Terminal a major transportation nexus had con­
tributed substantially to the site's value. The court held that 
public regulation need not guarantee a reasonable return on "that 
ingredient of property value created _ . . by the accumulated 
indirect social and direct governmental investment in the physical 
property, its functions and surroundings," 23 although it must do 
so on value created by the "efforts of the property owner." 24 The 
court also ruled that, in computing the return poss ible on the 
privately created increment of value, the TDR option must be 
taken into account.25 
The Grand Central Terminal controversy fits neatly within 
the disparity genre of land use dispute. The proposed develop­
ment - an office building - was prohibited not because of its 
inherent noxiousness, but because it would displace a use-a 
handsome facade - which the city wished to preserve for indis­
putably proper public purposes. Furthermore, the regulatory 
measure - a landmark designation - singled out Penn Central 
as owner of the landmark but left its neighbors free to profit from 
development under the generous density limits otherwise prevail­
ing in the zone. Finally, the public intervention bit hard; Penn 
Central was forced not only to forgo the benefits of a lucrative 
21 See Huxtable, Landmarks Are in Trouble with the Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
22, 1974, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 39, col. 1. 
22 42 N.Y.2d at 328-29, 366 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916-i7. 
23 Id. at 327, 366 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916. 
24 Id. at 327, 366 N.E.2d at 1272, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916. 
2� Id. 
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lease but to continue operating a facility which, it claimed, en­
joyed marginal profitability at best. 
Where Grand Central Terminal differs from other litigated 
instances of the disparity genre is in the deliberate effort of New 
York City to provide nondollar compensation as an offset to its 
draconian regulatory program.26 Electing the "middle way" of 
TDR, the city neither denied compensation altogether by invok­
ing the orthodox police power nor conceded the landowner's en­
titlement to the "just compensation" of eminent domain. The 
court of appeals responded to the city's bold initiative with equally 
bold efforts of its own, recognizing the centrality of the disparity 
issue to the controversy's resolution and commencing the job of 
chipping away at that issue's "impenetrable densities." 
V. Grand Central Terminal: AN ASSESSMENT 
A. Resolution of the Post-Euclidean Anomaly 
When the Supreme Court d ecided in Euclid that noncompen­
satory public regulation could reduce the market value of private 
land without constitutional objection, it left two questions unan­
swered. The first was how much reduction in value is permissible, 
and the second was what type of compensation is necessary when 
regulatio n  reduces the value of land below the permissible level. 
As Professor Berger has observed, 2; ;the Court itself resolved the 
first question one year after Euclid when, in Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge,28 it set the standard of reasonable beneficial use. Un­
til Grand Central Terminal, however, the courts have been silent 
on the second question. Accordingly, it has been assumed that, 
if government compensates at all, it must do so on the basis of 
the highest and best use standard of eminent domain. The bitter 
fruit of this reasoning has been the post-Euc lidean anomaly: 
while routine zoning regulation may reduce the value of land to 
that provided by a reasonable beneficial use, once government 
undertakes to compensate it must pay a price based on the ex­
treme standard of highest and best use. 
26 The one exception to the statement in text is Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. 
City of New York (Tudor Parks), 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 
5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 ( 1976), discussed pp. 418-2 l infra, w hich also 
entailed a TDR program - there invoked to preserve two privately owned p arks 
-and with respect to w hich Chief Judge Breitel also wrote an opinion for a 
unanimous court. For examples of litigation dealing with less explicit instances 
of the disparity genre, see Fair Compensation, supra note 6, at 1055-60. 
27 Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply t o  
Professor Costonis, 76 CoLuM. L .  REV. 799, 817 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Reply]. 
28 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
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Perhaps the single most important contribution of Chief Judge 
Breitel's opinion is his resolution o f  this anomaly. In square hold­
ing, he equated the compensation due when government over­
regulates with that necessary to duplicate the reasonable beneficial 
use, the standard for valid regulation required by due process in 
normal zoning disputes. His resolution of the anomaly is best 
expressed in his own words: 
Land use regulation often diminishes the value of property to 
the landowners. Constitutional standards, however, are offended 
only when that diminution leaves the owner with no reasonable 
use of the property. The situation with transferable develop­
ment rights is analogous. If the substitute rights received pro­
vide reasonable compensation for a landowner forced to relin­
quish development rights on a landmark site, there has been no 
deprivation of due process. The compensation need not be the 
"just compensation" required i n  eminent domain, for there has 
been no attempt to take the property . . . . 
. . . These substitute rights are valuable, and provide sig­
nificant, perhaps "fair" compensation for the loss of rights above 
the terminal itself.29 
Two points expressed in this passage merit emphasis. First, 
when overregulation, rather than a true "taking," is at issue, the 
compensation clause of the fifth amendment is inapplicable. The 
pertinent provision is instead the due process clause of the four­
teenth amendment. Second, the same constitutional standard­
reasonable beneficial use - determines the validity of both the 
regulation and the compensation which must be paid to validate 
overregulation. In either case, the fundamental principle is the 
same: rudimentary fairness is required to satisfy the demands of 
due process.30 
29 42 N.Y.2d at 335-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22. 
3° Critics might object that Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning unduly favors 
government over the landowner. For example, the critical matter of determining 
whether a measure falls into the police power or into the eminent domain box 
turns largely o n  the regulating government's assumptions at the time it adopts the 
measure, not on the actual character of the measure's impact at the regulated site. 
The eminent domain classification will generally not apply when government be­
lieves that a measure constitutes valid regulation either because it falls within the 
police power's ambit or because it is attended by an appropriate compensatory 
offset. If the regulation is found to be overbroad or the compensation insufficient, 
the measure may be invalidated under the fourteenth a mendment; but there is 
no condemnation. That the measure may bar virtually any use of the regulated 
site as in Tudor Parks, see pp. 418-2 I infra, seems to be ignored. By providing 
declaratory relief only, Chief Judge Breitel imposes the expenses of delay and 
litigation upon landowners who successfully contest an overregulatory measure 
even though these expenses are directly attributable to the tainted governmental 
intervention. 
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B. A Bifurcated Police Power 
Does the eminent domain, the police, or some third power 
provide the constitutional underpinnings for Chief Judge Brei­
tel's resolution of the post-Euclidean anomaly? He clearly ruled 
out eminent domain in Grand Central Terminal by denying that 
overregulation is a "taking" 31 and by insisting that "fair" rather 
than "just" compensation is sufficient to save an overregulatory 
measure.32 As he put the case: 
In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic landmarks 
through use of the eminent domain power might be desirable or 
even required. But when a less expensive alternative is available, 
especially when a city is in financial distress, it should not be 
forced to choose between witnessing the demolition of its glorious 
past and mortgaging its hopes for the future. The landmark 
preservation provisions of the Administrative Code represent an 
effort to take a middle way.33 
While the implication that impoverished cities somehow enjoy a 
lesser duty to compensate than affluent ones is dubious, Chief 
Judge Breitel's general conclusion that the eminent domain route 
is inappropriate for disparity genre disputes is not. Highest and 
best use awards are neither necessary to insure overregulated land­
owners equitable treatment nor financially or procedurally prac­
ticable for most local governments. 
Chief Judge Breitel's position does tilt in government's favor, though perhaps 
not unduly so. Surely government's assumptions when it regulates are entitled to 
great weight in a classification effort. Government should not be severely penalized 
for guessing wrongly in an area so permeated with uncertainty, especially when 
the regulatory measures in question are seldom comparable to the outright acqui­
sitions traditionally undertaken through eminent domain. Moreover, even when 
regulation approaches confiscation, bona fide attempts to compensate may gen­
erate the same uncertainty, as subsequent discussion of Tudor Parks points out. 
See pp. 418-21 infra. If government abuses the forbearance suggested by Chief 
Judge Breitel or acts in an acquisitory mode, judges can always invoke the ex­
ception allowing inverse condemnation relief. Most important of all, Chief Judge 
Breitel's position on this issue should not be divorced from his unwavering in­
sistence that the landowner receive rudimentary fairness. If fairness is implemented 
through nondollar compensatory offsets, the landowner is given a remedy, albeit 
not the expansive remedy of eminent domain. 
What I find most troubling in Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning is the unfairness 
that arises when, instead of providing a compensatory supplement, government 
chooses to rescind a measure which has been the subject of an adverse judgment 
in a declaratory action. In such a case, losses incurred during the interim period 
are left with the landowner. Such interim losses, however, may be the price which 
must be paid if government is to have the latitude necessary for effective public 
regulation. 
3142 N.Y.2d at 329-30, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. 
32 Id. at 335-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22. 
33 Id. at 337, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922. 
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If eminent domain is ruled out, should the police power, which 
in traditional understanding dispenses with compensation entirely 
be rejected as well? Although Chief Judge Breitel's position i� 
not entirely clear, his invocation of the standard of reasonable 
beneficial use under the fourteenth amendment implies that, for 
him, the imperative to compensate the overregulated landowner 
does derive from the police power. If this interpretation is cor­
rect, Chief Judge Breitel may justly be suspected of pouring new 
wine into old bottles. For the court's resolution of the Grand 
Central Terminal controversy differs from judicial resolution of 
ordinary zoning disputes by the way in which the reasonable bene­
ficial use standard is applied. In the former, conceded overregula­
tion is validated by compensation which brings the property's 
value up to that standard; in the latter, overregulation is not 
deemed to exist at all and hence no compensation is necessary. 
Chief Judge Breitel's willingness to pour the new wine of com­
pensation into vintage police power bottles was largely determined 
by the manner in which he conceptualized the constitutional issue. 
He viewed the "middle way" as falling not between the eminent 
domain and police powers, but between what he referred to as 
the "eminent domain" 34 and the "zoning" powers.35 To arrive at 
this characterization, he distinguished the landmark-TDR pro­
gram in Grand Central Terminal not from traditional exercises of 
the police power but from ordinary zoning regulation.36 Zoning 
is distinguishable, he reasoned, because it advances a comprehen­
sive community plan which assures orderly development or main­
tenance of an area's character and leaves each property owner 
in the zone "both benefited and restricted from exploitation, pre­
sumably wi>thout discrimination." 37 On the other hand, landmark 
designation was seen by Chief Judge Breitel as singling out the 
landmark owner for special and disadvantageous treatment. The 
landmark owner, he said, "may or may not benefit from the limita­
tion but his neighbors most likely will. In contrast both an owner 
and his neighbor benefit to some degree and in some manner from 
zoning." 38 
34 Id. at 330, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. 
35 Id. at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. 
36 Id. at 329-30, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. 
37 Id. at 3 29, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918. 
38 Id. at 330, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918. Chief Judge Breitel 
also observed that landmark restrictions are superficially similar to invalid spot 
zoning measures, which also single out individual properties for severe burdens or 
benefits. Id. at 330, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. But he noted that, 
unlike spot zoning measures, landmark restrictions do not offend equal protection 
standards because the distinctive architectural or historic character of landmark 
buildings sets them apart from nonlandmark properties, rendering the classification 
reasonable. Id. at 330-31, 366 N.E.zd at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.zd at 918. Nevertheless, 
I9ii)  THE DISPARITY ISSUE 
Insofar as his opinion implies that l andmark preservation does 
not advance a comprehensive commun i ty plan, Chief Judge 
B reitel seems to have m i sconstrued the purpose of l andmark 
programs . S ur ely they can be rega rded as a compone n t  of such 
plans, one of whose goa l s  i ncludes the m a i n te n ance of the desir­
able features of the existing urban fabr i c .  It is  true, of course, 
that landmark restrictions do zero in on individual properties 
while val id zon ing measures do n o t .  But  this fact merely estab­
lishes that the former are non zon ing exercises o f  the police 
power.:1!' not that they undercut the community's comprehensive 
planning efiort. 
Elsewhere, I have argued t h a t  the police power is an inappro­
priate basis for public regul ation-r um-compensation i n  d isparity 
genre disputes, suggesting for this purpose a third power - the 
"accommodation powe r . "  1"  I t  is un necessary to repeat the pros 
and cons of that argument here other than to note tha t  the sym­
metry of Chief J udge B re i tel 's  effort  to distinguish the Term inal 
dispute from the true emi nent domain and zoning gen res would 
improve markedly i f  the di stinction offered were that between the 
true em inent domain and true poliff powrr genres. \Vhichever 
choice is m ade.  i t  is crit ical to k eep in m ind that Chief Judge 
Breitel's alternatin• cuts both ways : while i t  reduces emi nent 
domain's burdens u pon government by d ispensing with j ust com­
pensation , it adds a new requirem ent to the police power i n  the 
form of fair compensation for d isparity genre d isputes. Chief 
Judge B reitel 's  overriding concern that the l andowner be fairly 
treated evidences his appreciation o f  the m iddle way's latter di­
mension .  But wil l  others be simil arly alert if  the middle way is 
termed a police power exercise ?  
C .  The Social Incrrmcnt Theory o f  Valuation 
Among the most daring strokes in Grand Central Terminal 
was Chief Judge B reitel 's evoc ation o f  the ghost o f  Henry 
he warns that the distinctiveness of landmarks provides all  the more reason for 
court� to be vigilant that due process guarantees are satisfied as well. Id. at 33 1 ,  
366 KE.2d at 1 2 75 ,  3 9 7  N.Y.S . 2 d  a t  9 1 8 ; cf. Udell v .  Haas, 2 1  N.Y.2 d 463 , 476-78, 
235 N.E.2d 897, 905-06 ( 1 968) (discrimination in zoning between two parcels on 
opposite sides of the same road invalidated where not justified by comprehensive 
plan, as such discrimination is  the "opposite side of the coin, one side of which is 
'spot zoning' " ) . Regrettably, the characteristics that make a building a charming 
landmark, particularly those of diminutive size and location in downtown. 
areas 
of high land value, are often the same c h aracteristics that make its retention as 
a landmark unprofitable. See J .  CosTONis, SPACE ADRIFT: SAVING URBAN LAND­
MARKS THROUGH THE CHICAGO PLAN' 6-I I ,  65-88 ( 1 9 74) · 
39 See N'ote, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of 
Historic Property, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 708, 7 2 2-24 ( 1 963 ) · 
•o See Fair Compensation, supra note 6, at 102 2 .  
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George 4 1  in deciding the case in part on the basis of a sod
.
al incre­
ment theory o f  valuation. Under that theory: t�e portion of a 
property's value that is attributable to public mvestment and 
concomitant community growth is excluded from the base upon 
which the property's reasonable beneficial use is calculated. After 
finding that public enterprise had been vital i n  ,�e development 
and prosperity of the Terminal, Chief Judge Bre1tel stated : 
[T ] he massive and indistinguishable public, governmental, and 
private contribu tions to a landmark like the Grand Central Ter­
minal are inseparably joint . . . . It is exceedingly difficult but 
imperative, nevertheless, to sort out the merged ingredients and 
to assess the rights and responsibilities of owner and society. A 
fair return is to be accorded the owner, but society is to receive 
its due for its share in the making of a once great railroad.42 
Among the host of public contributions to the Terminal's value 
cited by Chief Judge B reitel were subsidies, irrevocable fran­
chises, a delegation of the power of eminent domain, tax exemp­
tions, and, most important of all, the routing o f  various modes of 
transit to converge below the Terminal.43 
The social increment theory and its underpinnings occupy 
many paragraphs of the opinion and will undoubtedly mesmerize 
the commentators. If there ever was a case warranting the the­
ory's application, Grand Central Terminal is the case. The rough 
justice of discounting the Terminal 's rate o f  return on the basis 
of New York City's active contributions to the profitability of 
the Terminal and of Penn Central's nearby holdings is intuitively 
appealing. I question, however, whether the theory will prove as 
durable or generally useful in the form offered as Chief Judge 
Breitel's ()lther grounds for .the decision. 
There are two factors cutting against the theory's general ap­
plicability. First, it applies only to a small number of properties 
- like the Terminal - whose commercial u tility is largely a 
consequence of massive public investments at or near the site and 
whose owners are the beneficiaries of dramatic infusions of public 
largess. Hence, one should read very literally indeed Chief Judge 
Breitel's admonition that " Grand Central Terminal is no ordinary 
�an?�ark. "  44 Second, the segregation and quantification of an 
md1v1dual property's public and p rivate increments of value are 
truly formidable tasks, especially when the respective govern­mental and p rivate contributions have been made continuously 
41  See H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY ( 1881 ) ; H. GEORGE THE LAND QUES-TION ( 1 935 ) .  1 
:
: 42 N.Y.2d at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1 2 76,  397 N.Y.S. 2 d  at 919.  
4 4  �
�
-
at 332,  3 66 N.E.2d at 12 75-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 9 1 8-19 .  
· at 33 l ,  366 N.E.2d at 1 2 75,  397  N.Y.S.2d at 9 1 8  (emphasis added) . 
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over a long period. In this respect, sending attorneys out to de­
velop the pertinent data, as Chief Judge Breitel invited the liti­
gants to do in Grand Central Terminal,45 is akin to christening a 
search for the Holy Grail. 
Even granting its general applicability, whether and to what 
exitent the social increment theory was essential to the outcome 
in Grand Central Terminal is unclear. That it played an influen­
tial role in Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning is evident from the 
many paragraphs he allotted to it .  But in concluding that the 
return on .the Terminal was reasonable, he cited various other 
factors, including its continuing u tility for railroad purposes, the 
rentals received from its many concessionaires, its profitability 
as the "flagship" o f  other nearby Penn Central-owned properties, 
and the TD R offset granted Penn Central under New York City's 
landmark program. Indeed, the passage quoted earlier 46 can 
fairly be read to imply that the TDR offset alone afforded the 
Terminal a return sufficient to meet the minimum requirements 
of due process. Although one cannot be sure, it is a good guess 
that future courts, reluctant to become ensnared in the quixotic 
task of segregating a site's public and private increments o f  
value, will choose to view one or a combination of these later-cited 
factors as furnishing the basis of the decision in Grand Central 
Terminal. 
Where Chief Judge Breitel's innovative reasoning is likely to 
prove productive, however, is in its implicit support for public 
measures that seek partial recapture of private property's social 
increment of value to finance community amenities . In an earlier 
opinion, Chief Judge Breitel hinted at this possibility by suggest­
ing tha;t "assessments for public benefit" may ease the disparity 
dilemma provided that the courts are willing to sanction " an ex­
pansion of the traditional views with respect to what are assess­
able public benefits." 47 
TDR schemes aptly illustra;te the point. Recall the objection 
that TDR programs "artificially" restrict general zoning den­
sities within transfer districts in order to create a market for 
transferable rights. Under the theory expounded by Chief Judge 
Breitel, however, is not the "social increment of value" of prop­
erties within the transfer district p roperly " assessable" by gov­
ernment in aid of legitimate planning objectives? And if the re­
duction in value of these properties under a TDR p rogram is  
marginal (as is  the case under virtually all T D  R propos als in the 
4� Id. at 337,  366 N.E.2d at 12 79, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 92 2 .  
46 See p .  412 supra. 
47 Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York (Tudor Parks ) ,  39 N.Y.2d 
587, 599, 350 N.E.2d 381, 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 1  12-13, appeal dismissed, 4 2 9  U.S. 
990 (1976). 
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United States 48) , and therefore less than their social incr
ement 
of value cannot the reduction be deemed a valid governm
ent 
assessme�t? I f  so, Grand Central Terminal's two major analyti
c 
strands - its acceptance o f  the social increment of value theory 
and its recognition of the role of TDR's in affor�in_
g fair com­
pensation - are mutually reinforcing despite their mdependert 
development in the opinion .49 
D. T DR in the Courts 
Chief Judge Breitel sustained the facial validity of TDR's as 
compensation both in Grand Central Terminal and in an earlier 
opinion, Fred F .  French Investing Co. v. City of New York 
( Tudor Parks )  .50 Agreeing that development rights may be sep­
arated from their host parcel and transferred to other sites, he 
confirmed that these rights are an essential part o f  the host par­
cel's value and "may not be disregarded in determining whether 
the [planning regulations have] destroyed the economic value of 
the underlying property. " 01 In strong dictum in Tudor Parks, 
moreover, he endorsed the establishment of municipal develop­
ment rights banks - institutions empowered to condemn and re­
sell development rights - as a supplement to purely private trad­
ing in the rights."2 Finally, in Grand Central Terminal, he held 
that development rights may serve as the nondollar compensation 
required to bring the return on overregulated property up to the 
reasonable beneficial use standard. To Penn Central's contention 
that the development rights it  received might h ave a lesser value 
at the transferee sites than at the Terminal, Chief Judge Breitel 
responded that a loss in value at the transferee site does not of it-
48 Brief accounts of many of the variants of the TDR device can be found in 
THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS : A NEW TECHNIQUE OF LAND USE REGU­
LATION (J.  Rose ed. I975 ) .  To b e  contrasted with the modest American approach is 
that proposed in Brazil, under which landowners would be required to purchase 
from government all rights in excess of those that could be incorporated into a 
one-story structure covering the owner's entire lot. See de Azevedo, de Ambrosis 
& do Valle Nogueira, 0 "Solo Criado," C.J. ARQUITETURA, No. 16, at 9 ( 1977) . 
The proposal is included in a national land use bill (Anteprojeto da Lei de Desen­
volvimento Urbano)  now under discussion by Brazilian n ational officials. The bill 
is reproduced in id. at 26. 
49 This argument is developed in greater detail in Fair Compensation, supra 
note 6, at 1032-3 3 ,  and in Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: A n  Exploratory 
Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 , 97-99, 107-1 7 ( 1 973 ) . . so 39 N.Y.2d 587,  350 N.E.2 d 3 8 1 ,  385 N.Y.S.2d 5 ,  appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 
990 ( 1 976) . 
:� 3 9  N.Y.2d at 5 97 ,  350 N.E.2d at 387,  3 85 N.Y.S.2d at 1 r .  
. Id. �t 5 98-99, 350 N.E.2d at 3 88, 3 85 N.Y.S.2d at 1 2 .  For a TDR proposal mcorporatmg a municipal bank, see J. CosTONIS, supra note 3 8 ,  ch . 2 .  
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self mean "that the substitution of rights amounts to a deprivation 
of property without due process of law" as long as " the substitute 
rights received provide reasonable compensation for a landowner 
forced to relinquish development rights on a landmark site." r.:i 
Despite Chief Judge Breitel' s  general endorsement of TDR 
programs, it would be a grave error to conclude that specific TDR 
programs are immune from judicial invalidation as applied. In 
fact, the New York Court of Appeals struck down the Tudor 
Parks TD R program, under which New York City attempted to 
preserve two privately owned parks in the Tudor City complex 
on Manhattan' s  East Side by precluding development on them 
altogether but making their development rights transferable to 
a district located elsewhere on the East Side.51  Citing the pro­
gram's "mandatory" and "contingency-ridden" character, Chief 
Judge Breitel, writing for a unanimous court, castigated it as 
having created "floating development rights, utterly unusable 
until they could be attached to some accommodating real prop­
erty, available by happenstance of prior ownership, or by grant, 
purchase, or devise, and subject to the contingent app rovals of ad­
ministrative agencies." 55 In contrast, he later approved the Grand 
Central Terminal program ostensibly because the rights there were 
transferable to a variety of neighboring sites (several of which 
Penn Central owned ) ,56 because the rights could be split between 
different transferee sites, and because Penn Central itself had pre­
viously considered transferring a portion of the rights to two 
neighboring sites it owned.57 
Chief Judge Breitel's stated grounds for distinguishing the 
two TDR programs are neither convincing nor helpful to mu­
nicipal officials who wish to design a TDR program that will pass 
muster. In truth, the administrative contingencies of both pro­
grams were essentially the same. Moreover, both programs were 
mandatory in effect, both authorized the splitting of development 
rights, and both offered transfer districts which contained numer­
ous sites suitable for development of the type desired. Indeed, 
the transfer rights in Tudor Parks were potentially more valua�le 
than those in Grand Central Terminal because the transfer dis­
trict was much larger and enjoyed median land values twice those 
'3 42 N.Y.2d at 335,  366 N.E.2d at 1 2 7 8, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 9 2 1 .  
�4 For a n  especially well-informed account of the Tudor Parks TDR program, 
see Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause : The 
Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77, 79-85 ( r 974 ) . 
5' 39 N.Y.2d at 5 97-98, 3 5 0  N.E.2d at 388, 3 8 5  N.Y.S.2d at 1 1 .  
'6 42 N.Y.2d at 334, 3 6 6  N.E.2d at 1 2 7 7, 3 9 7  N.Y.S.2d at 920· 
'7 Id. at 335, 366 N.E.2d at 1 2 7 7 ,  397 N.Y.S.2d at 9 2 1 .  
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of the parks themselves.58 Finally, the Tudor Parks developer, 
like Penn Central, had at one time unsuccessfully sought per­
mission from the city to transfer its rights 59 and, after �e en­
actment of the pertinent TDR program, had actually received a 
"substantial offer" 60 for those rights. The two situations differed 
only in that the Tudor Parks owner, although a leading New 
York City realtor-developer, apparently did not itself own land 
within the transfer district. While this difference may have made 
sale or use of the rights somewhat more problematic, it hardly 
negated their value, as evidenced by the "substantial of er" that 
the developer received for them. 
How then can one explain the differing outcomes in these 
cases ? Perhaps the difference is that in Tudor Parks no residual 
return whatever was possible once the parks had been downzoned, 
while in Grand Central Terminal a significant return accrued to 
the restricted site. In the latter instance, therefore, the role of 
the TDR's was to supplement an existing return, while in Tudor 
Parks they afforded the only possibility of return. One might 
take this reasoning a step further by asking whether Tudor Parks 
is a disparity genre dispute at all. It could be that the court 
perceived the Tudor Parks scheme as invading the landowner's 
entitlements so drastically that the court would have been satis­
fied with nothing short of  .the city's use of  its eminent domain 
power to acquire ;the parks outright. After all, the city did down­
zone the parks to zero density; further, it insisted that the de­
veloper open them to the public and maintain them at its own 
expense.61 
A second rationale may be ventured which is also rooted in 
the court's skepticism about the marketability of the Tudor Parks 
development rights. Read broadly, Grand Central Terminal and 
Tudor Parks passed judgment on three types of TDR programs ­
one employing a municipal development rights bank to purchase 
or condemn rights from the restricted landowner (approved in 
dictu?1 i� Tudor Parks) , a second authorizing the owner to trans­
fer his nghts to a nearby site also owned by him ( approved in 
5 8  See Marcus, supra note 54, at 83-84. 
59 Earlier, the developer had requested permission to transfer the TDR's to a 
bui
.
lding that it proposed to construct on a platform over Forty-Second Street. 
This request was denied on urban design grounds. See id. at 8 1 .  60 Id. at 84 n .2 2 .  
61 T d" . . h o 1stmgu15 the two programs on this basis, however, assumes a point 
that regre�tably was not argued or discussed in the Tudor Parks litigation - that �he park sites 
_
could be viewed as isolated economically from the Tudor City build­
mgs s�rrounding them. If the parks and surrounding buildings had been viewed 
as an integrated architectural and economic complex as they obviously had been when constructed initially, the facts in Tudor Parks �ould have been substantially analogous to those in Grand Central Terminal. 
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Grand Central Terminal) ,  and a third requiring transfer of the 
rights to a district located some distance from the restricted prop­
erty and lacking the common ownership feature of the second 
( invalidated in Tudor Parks) .  Perhaps Chief Judge Breitel's 
message to municipal planning authorities is that he is willing to 
restrain his doubts about the economic utility of development 
rights in the first two instances, but not in the third. I f  so, Chief 
Judge Breitel's reasoning deserves the closest scrutiny because 
the great majority of current and proposed TDR programs are 
of the third type. 
To distinguish between TDR programs on the basis of the 
transferor's ownership of sites in the transfer district would be 
to resolve a complex economic and factual problem by legal fiat. 
The value of TDR's depends upon the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the individual TDR program. Undoubtedly, TDR 
programs involving area-wide transfers can be conceived that are 
so out of line with the realities of the real estate market that the 
purported recompense offered the restricted owner is mythical 
at best. But, as empirical studies undertaken by this writer and 
others confirm, it is no less conceivable that these programs can 
provide substantial recompense and, more to the point, that the 
rights made transferable under them will in most cases pro ve 
more valuable than rights made transferable only to adjacent 
sites.62 Indeed, findings of precisely this nature explain why the 
Chicago Plan,63 a proposal for the preservation of  landmark 
buildings in that city, abandoned the adjacency limitation of the 
Grand Central Terminal TDR program in favor of area-wide 
transfers.64 It would be ironic indeed if this modification, under­
taken to enhance the marketability of development rights! were 
to prove the undoing of a TDR program on the ground that area­
wide transfers, as a matter of law, undermine the program's eco­
nomic credibility. 
62 See, e.g., J. CoSTONIS, supra note 3 8 ,  at 48-5 1 ,  54-56, 5 9-60, 1o7-o8 ; J .  
CosTONIS & J .  SHLAEs, DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS : A SOLUTION TO C111-
CAGO's LANDMARKS DILEMMA 3-7, 16-19 ( Chicago Chapter Foundation A.I.A . & 
Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation 1 9 7 1 ) ; cf. J .  CosToNIS & R. DEVov, TnE 
PUERTO Rico PLAN: ENVIRONMENTAL P ROTECTION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
TRANSFER, PART III ( Conservation Trust of Puerto Rico & Urban Land Instit�te 
1975) (recommending transfer of development rights to designated tran�fer dis­
tricts anywhere on the island, whose zoning and planning controls are designed to 
create a favorable market for the transferable rights ) .  More general support for 
the proposition in text can be found in the 25 economic analyses of TDR's cited 
in DEVELOPMENTS RIGHTS BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 1 3 .  . 63 See Costonis, The Chicago Plan : Incentive Zoning and the Preservation °1 
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 5 74 ( 197 2 )  · 
64 Id. at 5 78, 584-89. 
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E. Reasonable Beneficial Use : A n  Ethical Standard 
or an A ccounting Rule ? 
Conspicuously absent from Grand Central Terminal is any 
attempt to reduce to dollars the Terminal's value in its reasonable 
beneficial use, its value when overregulated, or the value of Penn 
Central's development rights. At first blush, the omissions are 
puzzling both because these economic indices are basic to Chief 
Judge Breitel's conceptualization o f  the disparity issue and be­
cause the New York City landmark ordinance provides an ex­
plicit quantitative standard by equating the reasonable beneficial 
use of a p rivately owned landmark with a six percent return on 
its assessed valuation.65 However, the omissions are explained by 
the fact that the proceedings never reached the stage at which 
an attempt at valuation would have been appropriate. While the 
opinion sustained the landmark designation, i t  also granted leave 
to the parties to develop evidence bearing on the applicability of 
the social increment theory to the controversy.66 Without this 
evidence to measure how much of  the Terminal's value should be 
excluded from the base for calculating its reasonable beneficial 
use, application of  the foregoing indices in a more concrete man­
ner was impossible.67 
In future litigation, however, an undertaking of this nature 
will confront courts that accept Chief Judge B reitel's formulation 
of the disparity issue . Some commentators are skeptical that the 
courts can do the job. Professor Berger, for example, confesses 
to having "little faith that the courts can establish workable rules 
that would readily distinguish the vaguely compensable from the 
vaguely noncompensable situations." 68 Indeed, he calls into 
65 N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8A, § 207- 1 .o ( v )  (Williams 1976) . 
66 See 42 N.Y.2d at 337,  366 N.E.2d at 12 79, 3 9 7  N.Y.S.2d at 92 2.  
6 7  There is an additional reason that Chief Judge B reitel may have felt it un­
necessary to quantify the pertinent indices of value - a reason of a more theo­
retical character. The TDR program in Grand Central Terminal was designed to 
afford Penn Central an opportunity for economic return equal to or greater than 
that it would have had absent the restriction. It did so by allowing Penn Central 
to transfer the full equivalent of its unused development rights to parcels with a 
value roughly equivalent to that of the Terminal site. If we assume that the 
reasonable beneficial use of the Terminal site could have been set at a lower level 
than its profit potential prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark and 
that the transfer rights would in fact bring a price roughly equivalent to their 
value at the Terminal site, the TDR program would afford Penn Central a sub­
stantially greater return than the fourteenth amendment demands. Under this 
reasoning, it was not inappropriate for Chief Judge Breitel to have disdained the 
fine tuning effort entailed in quantifying values for the various indices and to 
have engaged instead in a more general inquiry into the transfer rights' overall 
utility to Penn Central. 
68 Reply, supra note 2 7, at 821. 
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question the capacity o f  l egislatures to do so 69 �av
.
e in the �ase ?f 
"operating p roperties" such as apartment bmldmgs, which, m 
the context o f  rent control schemes or landmark designations, are 
entitled to a six percent return on assessed valuation under New 
York City ordinances.7° For Professor Berger, computation of 
the value o f  a property's reasonable beneficial use turns on two 
variables - the property's investment base and its rate of re­
turn.71 Excepting the case of operating properties, he believes 
that the efforts to "predicate a fair return or to establish an in­
vestment base create difficulties defying solution ," because the 
base value depends on the return and the fair return depends 
upon the base.'� To avoid this circularity, he urges what he terms 
the "balancing process - public benefit versus private detri­
ment" 73 as a more generally useful approach to resolving the 
constitutional issues posed by overregulation. 
Whether the courts - or legislatures - can and will rise to 
the task of fine-tuning the standards of fair compensation has yet 
to be tested because judicial recognition of their emergence as an 
issue is original to Grand Central Terminal. Full treatment of 
the problem and of Professor Berger's discerning critique 74 of 
the "middle way" discussed in this and an earlier essay 75 of mine 
is impossible here, but three general observations can be offered . 
First, the constitutional standard o f  reasonable beneficial use -
which must now be applied in New York whenever a landowner 
complains of overregulation - is essentially a standard for ju­
dicial review of legislative and administrative programs for com­
pensation ;  it is not a substitute for those programs. Second, as a 
standard rather than a rule, reasonable beneficial use demarcates 
a threshold of fairness and does not purport to provide a quanti­
tative measure of value. Consequently, mathematical precision 
69 Id. at 818-19. 
70 Id. at 818. 
7 1  Id. 
12 Id. at 819.  
73 Id. at 823.  
7 4  My praise for Professor Berger's critique is  not offered perfunctorily. One 
of the zoning game's most tough-minded and astute commentators, Berger has 
penned a critique that merits the closest scrutiny of legislators, judges, and com­
mentators who wish seriously to address the disparity issue. If he is correct about 
the inability of legislators and j udges to do the fine tuning called for in this 
essay, his critique severely undermines the utility of this analysis. As I see it, the 
basic differences between Berger and myself are my relatively greater optimism on 
the possibility of fine tuning and my conviction that legislators and courts must 
be forced to the test if a suitable replacement is to emerge for the former, nearly 
defunct consensus in America concerning landed property's entitlements. See pp. 
408-09 supra. It is for this reason that I view relapse to the "balancing test" as 
unfortunate counsel, at least in disparity genre disputes. See pp. 42 5-26 infra. 
7 5  See generally Fair Compensation, supra note 6. 
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is not required of the judiciary in applying the reasonable bene­
ficial use standard. Nor is mathematical precision necessary to 
improve existing land use jurisprudence. The constitutional stand­
ard developed in Grand Central Terminal will insure that thought­
ful attention is paid to the claims of the landowner concerning 
the impac t  of regulation on his parcel's capacity to earn a reason­
able return ,  and that the role o f  nondollar compensation in miti­
gating overregulation is intelligently appraised in terms of its 
economic credibility and its status under a reformulated police 
power. Both steps will mark a welcome advance over .the impres­
sioni"stic opinions that flaw the current jurisprudence. 
A final observation, implicit i n  the first two, is that reasonable 
beneficial use is primarily an ethical standard despite its rendition 
in the syntax of the accountant. Community values and the re­
quirement of fundamental fairness for the landowner determine 
whether the standard should b e  employed at all - it obviously 
has no role where the proscribed land use is  a nuisance - and, if 
so, the level of the "threshold" of fairness. The great majority of 
land use d isputes involve little more than the prevention of harm­
ful externalities and should therefore continue to be resolved 
under traditional police power principles. In the disparity genre 
case, where o.ther considerations predominate, the fourteenth 
amendment standard is necessary to insure fair treatment both 
for the overregulated landowner and, let it not be forgotten, 
for the regulatory authority as well. 
Although reasonable beneficial use functions as a standard in 
the judici ary's hands, it must be translated into more concrete 
form - through quantification o r  otherwise - by legislatures that 
implemen t  compensatory programs. These legislative efforts too 
are ultimately founded on ethical considerations rather than on 
those of a neutral accounting n ature. In fact, the vicious circle 
involving investment base and fair return that so vexes Professor 
Berger can be resolved only by a prior value judgment that affords 
the predicate for subsequent accounting calculations. For in­
stance, New York City's six percent figure for the return on land­
marks and rent-controlled buildings - which Professor Berger 
apparently approves - is not divinely ·preordained. Forceful 
arguments can undoubtedly be made for setting it at five or eight 
percent. Realistically perceived, the six percent rate is nothing 
more or less than the outcome o f  the familiar legislative process 
of compromise of competing interests, in which the ethical values 
of the public decisionmaker play a dominant role. 
Why shouldn't a similar process be appropriate to apply the 
reasonable beneficial use standard to various categories of non­
operating properties as well ? The answer surely does not lie in 
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the circularity objection because,  as the example o f  New York 
City's six percent rule illustrates , circularity yields to the tug and 
pull of the legislative process. The difficulties lie rather in the 
confusion concerning what this society 's bottom-line perception 
of landed property's entitlemen ts should be. This Comment 
urges that legislatures, not the courts, take the leading role in 
resolving the disparity issue because, whatever their failings, 
legislatures are better equipped than the courts both to seek 
consensus on this complex and controversial issue and to prescribe 
rules implementing the reasonable beneficial use standard for 
particular categories of regulated properties. The judiciary's 
task, under the constitutionally mandated standard, is to decide 
whether the rules that legislatures fix fall within this standard's 
ambit. 
Contrary to Professor Berger ' s  viewpoint, therefore, approval 
of Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning does not commit one to the 
view that the reasonable beneficial use standard is a "philosopher's 
stone" 7 6  that "dos [es] out the controversy over the bounds of 
the regulatory power" 77 or that it will make "simpler" 78 estab­
lishment of priorities among ethical values. But the reasonable 
beneficial use standard and the other determinants of value cited 
by Chief Judge Breitel as establishing a context for dealing pro­
ductively with the disparity issue do illuminate the sources of  the 
current impasse and contribute significantly to its resolution. No 
less importantly, Chief Judge B reitel's  approval of those deter­
minants signals the judiciary's willingness to accord legislatures 
significant latitude in prescribing the nature of the compensation 
due overregulated landowners. While there are many uncertain­
ties attending such prescriptive efforts, particular rules for com­
pensation are unlikely to prove objectionable to the judiciary so 
long as they are responsibly implemented and the compensation 
they provide is fair under the fourteenth amendment. 
Effor:ts of this nature, in my view, are superior to the '1balanc­
ing process" as a basis for resolving disparity genre disputes. As 
Grand Central Terminal so forcefully illustrates, there are cases 
in which the public benefits in question are priceless but the im­
pact of noncompensatory regulation on the landowner devastating. 
What is gained by ((balancing" in such instances? The suggestion 
flatly abandons fairness as the fulcrum of decision, substituting 
for it the all-or-nothing approach that created the impasse in the 
first place. Moreover, whatever the problems of administering the 
reasonable beneficial use standard, the balancing test is incom-
76 Reply, supra note 27, at 816. 
77 Id. at 821 .  
7 8  Id. at 823. 
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parably more open-ended. Assuming that the pertinent factors 
can be isolated, the test tells us nothing about the relative weight 
that should be assigned to each, let alone how conflicts among 
them should be resolved. 
On this issue as on the many other questions discussed in this 
Comment, Chief Judge Breitel has given us inventive and, in my 
view, strikingly useful assistance. He is surely correct that on 
these matters " the last word has not . . .  been spoken ." But he 
is altogether too humble in suggesting that "it has hardly been 
envisaged." 
